Zimbabwe

Africa

Kişi Başına GSYİH ($)
$2,119.3
Population (in 2021)
16.6 million

değerlendirme

Ülke riski
E
İş Ortamı
E
önceden
E
önceden
E

suggestions

Özet

Güçlü yanlar

  • Abundant mineral resources (gold, nickel, lithium, platinum, diamonds, etc.)
  • Agricultural wealth (maize, tobacco, cotton)
  • Tourism development potential

Zayıf yanlar

  • Economy devastated by hyperinflation
  • Cash and currency shortages exacerbated by endemic corruption and smuggling
  • External financing rendered almost inaccessible due to unsustainable debt and massive arrears to international financial institutions and bilateral creditors
  • Dependence on the prices of volatile commodities, some of which are smuggled across borders
  • Significant dollarisation of the economy (around 75% of transactions)
  • Underdeveloped infrastructure (roads, energy, water, sanitation, etc.)
  • Weak investment and productivity
  • Precarious food and health situation, dependence on humanitarian aid
  • Widespread poverty and informality, mass unemployment (21% of the population in 2023)

Ticaret borsaları

Mal ihracatı toplamın yüzdesi olarak

Güney Afrika
31%
Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri
26%
Çin
18%
Mozambik
5%
Avrupa
5%

Mal ithalatıı toplamın yüzdesi olarak

Güney Afrika 52 %
52%
Çin 22 %
22%
Bahamas, Commonwealth of the 7 %
7%
Bahreyn 6 %
6%
Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri 6 %
6%

Görünüm

Bu bölüm kurumsal finans görevlileri ve kredi yöneticileri için değerli bir araçtır. Ülkede kullanılmakta olan ödeme ve borç tahsilatı uygulamaları hakkında bilgi verilmektedir.

Economy hit by drought and hyperinflation

Crippled by the chronic uncertainty that has hampered private consumption and investment in Zimbabwe for a number of years, economic growth will be weaker in 2024 due to agricultural production (around 10% of GDP and accounting for over 60% of jobs) being hampered by the dramatic consequences of the El Niño weather phenomenon. However, bigger harvests, a buoyant mining sector (albeit at a modest level) and an increase in tourism should contribute to a rebound in growth in 2025. Although the fall in nickel prices (32.3% of exports in 2022) will reduce export revenues from mining products – the main source of foreign currency – the sustained high prices of gold (30.3%) will offset the losses, while there are numerous projects to exploit lithium, of which the country has the largest reserves in Africa. In December 2022, Zimbabwe suspended exports of the ore in its raw form, aiming to encourage the development of a local processing industry and attract foreign investors, almost exclusively Chinese. This decision led to the signing of a USD 310 million agreement in June 2024 for the construction of a lithium concentrator (under a Sino-British consortium), which is expected to be operational in early 2026. However, the country's strategy is hampered by a deteriorating business environment and, more importantly, recurrent power cuts which are estimated to cost up to 6% of GDP every year despite the extension of the capacity of the Hwange thermal power station in 2023 to compensate for the drop in hydroelectric production caused by the drought. Public spending on modernising infrastructure, particularly the road network, will also help to support the expansion of the construction sector, even if the profound lack of interest shown by external creditors, put off by unsustainable debt, severely limits the prospects for long-term growth to below the target of 5% per year.

In recent years, the country's economy has suffered several bouts of hyperinflation triggered by a sharp depreciation in its currency (the official rate). The latest depreciation, of around 70% in the first three months of 2024, forced the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to replace the old Zimbabwean dollar on 5 April 2024, less than five years after its creation, with a new currency backed by the US dollar and guaranteed by the country's mineral reserves, the Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG), which had already lost almost half its value against the dollar just six months after its introduction. Inflationary pressures remain, including drought, which has led to a serious shortage of foodstuffs and increases in domestic tax, all of which will continue to weigh on household consumption, as shrinking purchasing power is only very partially being offset by pay rises.

Severely restricted access to external financing

The budget situation is likely to remain deteriorated in 2025, as in 2024. This is due to additional emergency spending in response to the agricultural crisis (mainly on food imports), high levels of investment in modernising the country's infrastructure and the increase in civil servants' salaries (almost 45% of government spending in 2024) in an attempt to tackle hyperinflation. At the same time, recent tax measures (higher taxes on companies and on lithium exports, the introduction of taxes on mining capital gains and on sugar, etc.), some of which have not in fact been applied (thus discrediting the budget) will not fully offset the rise in spending. Because of the difficulty of financing it other than by borrowing from local banks and a few rare foreign partners (bilateral or commercial banks), the majority of which are Chinese, the risk of monetising the public deficit persists despite official commitments not to do so.

After two decades of suspended debt servicing, Zimbabwe resumed (symbolic) repayments to its external creditors in 2021. However, negotiations to clear its arrears and restructure its debt are progressing slowly, which is restricting any significant international financial support. However, the burden of public debt – around 70% of which is held by foreign partners – should ease in 2024 and even more in 2025, thanks to the rebound in growth. As a gesture of good faith, Zimbabwe plans to adopt an IMF benchmark programme (horizon uncertain), which would informally monitor its economy.

The trade deficit, weakened by increased import requirements associated with the drought which has hit the agricultural sector hard, as well as the need for capital goods to modernise the country's transport infrastructure, is set to move slightly into the red in 2024. The trend will be exacerbated by slower growth in exports, mainly from mining, but should be reversed by 2025. At the same time, imports of services and repatriation of dividends from foreign companies related to mining will continue to drag over the period. These items will be more than offset by growing remittances from migrant workers, which is the main driver of the moderate current account surplus. That said, Zimbabwe's external position will remain fragile due to limited capital inflows and clandestine outflows. As a result, FDI, which is already particularly low and concentrated in the mining sector, is forecast to decline over the 2024-2025 period.

Controversial elections against a backdrop of international isolation

President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who rose to power in November 2017 after a period of “military-assisted transition” that forced Robert Mugabe to resign after more than 30 years at the head of the country, was re-elected for a second term in 2023. At the same time, the presidential party (ZANU-PF), which has ruled the country since its independence in 1980, won the legislative elections and secured a majority in Parliament. The elections were nonetheless marred by numerous irregularities that were denounced by the opposition, while international observers pointed to their lack of transparency. The population's discontent, exacerbated by hyperinflation, food insecurity, harsher living conditions, rising poverty – the poverty rate rose from 21.6% in 2011 to 39.8% in 2019 – and the erosion of civil liberties, remains contained by the security forces, which are backed by the government and its iron fist.

After a period disrupted by post-election unrest, the country's strategy of international re-engagement and negotiations to restructure its debt are tentatively resuming. Relations with the West remain tense, and Europe and the US have applied economic sanctions against several of Zimbabwe's top leaders, including President Mnangagwa himself, who has been accused of corruption and human rights violations. Against this backdrop, China remains a major economic ally, providing almost all foreign investment, particularly in the mining sector, while South Africa is the country's main trading partner, given that Zimbabwe has no access to the sea. At regional level, the regime's poor reputation did not prevent Zimbabwe from taking over the rotating presidency of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 2024 for a period of one year.

Last updated: November 2024

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